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MANSLAUGHTER: PRELIMINARY STUDY OF CATEGORIES
OF VOLUNTARY

MANSLAUGHTER

Voluntary manslaughter at common law is usually defined as an
intentional homicide -committed without malice aforethought but
in the heat of passion caused by adequate provocation.' The purpose of this note is to determine whether this definition is all embracing, or to state it in a different manner, whether there is more
than one category in voluntary manslaughter.
In order to clearly present the problem to the reader, the use
of the following analysis is suggested in the case of an intentional
homicide:
(1)

Is the intentional -killing either justifiable or excusable?
If so, the accused is acquitted.
(2) If the answer to (1) is "no" the next question is, Does the
homicide fall within one of the recognized categories of
murder7 Or to put the question in another way, Is malice
aforethought present? If so, the homicide is murder and
not manslaughter and therefore not a concern of this note.
(3) If the answer to (2) is "no", the homicide is necessarily
voluntary manslaughter.
If the above analysis is applied and the conclusion reached that
the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, an adequate
provocation would necessarily be found in the facts of the case if
the usual common law definition is correct. If the defendant is guilty
and an adequate provocation is not present, then it must be concluded that there is another or other categories in the law of voluntary manslaughter.
To decide such a question one must have a knowledge of what
the courts have held to be an adequate provocation. Many defimtions have been given- but a summation of them all seems to result
in the rule that the adequate provocation necessary to reduce an
intentional killing from murder to manslaughter is that provocation which is of such a nature as would, in the mind of a reasonable man, stir resentment and produce action arising from passion
rather than judgment. The passion referred to in the definition is
commonly described as heat of passion and is a necessary element
'Olds v. State, 44 Fla. 452, 33 So. 296 (1902), Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52, 111 S. W 2d 445 (1937) Commonwealth v.
Carroll, 326 Pa. 135, 191 Atl. 610 (1937).
'Miller v. Commonwealth, 163 Ky. 246, 173 S. W 761 (1915)
State v Borders, 199 S. W 180 (Mo. 1917), Wooten v. State, 171
Tenn. 362, 103 S. W 2d 324, 326 (1937).

STUDENT

NOTES

AND

-COMMENTS

3
of provocation. It is also necessary that the homicide must have
been committed before the lapse of a reasonable time for cooling,"
and that the provocation must have given rise to the heat of passion
which was the cause of the act that resulted in the homicide.'
As to what circumstances have been held by the courts as
giving rise to adequate provocation, the weight of authority seems
to be that assault and battery,' mutual quarrel or combat, unlawful
arrest,' and the detection by a husband of his wife in an act of
adultery' engender adequate provocation. The test of whether there
is adequate provocation is objective, %.e.whether or not the provoca0
tion was sufficient to excite the passions of a reasonable man,"
and is a question of fact to be determined by the jury" However,
it is to be noted that the killing will be murder if actual malice is
present m any of the above cases.
The foregoing cases involving provocation are embraced within
the limits of the common law definition of voluntary manslaughter
and establish what the writer will designate as category (A) of
voluntary manslaughter. The definition used in this category is the
usual one for common law voluntary manslaughter.
The next step is to determine whether there is another or
other categories of voluntary manslaughter. A conviction of voluntary manslaughter in the absence of adequate provocation would
demand another category or categories. It is m this respect that
Commonwealth v. Beverly"12 is particularly interesting. The defendant in the case was tried for the murder of two men while they
were robbing his chicken roost. The jury failed to agree and the
commonwealth asked the Court of Appeals for a certification of the

'Shorter v. Commonwealth, 252 Ky. 472, 67 S. W 2d 695 (1934)
State v. White, 138 N. C. 704, 51 S. E. 44 (1905) State v. Carter, 58
N. E. 2d 794 (Ohio App. 1944), Perkins, The Law of Homicide
(1946) 36 J. CRim. L. 391, 422.
'See note 3 supra.
See note 3 supra.
'Williams v Commonwealth, 80 Ky 313 (1882) State v. Merrick, 171 N C. 788, 88 S. E. 501 (1916) Butler v State, 108 Tex.
Cr. R. 643, 2 S. W 2d 254 (1928).
'Gann v State, 30 Ga. 67 (1860), Hanna v Commonwealth, 242
State v Coble, 177 N. C. 588,
Ky. 584, 46 S. W 2d 1098 (1932)
99 S. E. 339 (1919).
"
'State v. Kuykendall, 37 N. M. 135, 19 P 2d 744 (1933), Dickey, Culpable Homicides In Resisting Arrest (1933) 18 CORN. L. Q.
373, 379; Note (1945) 34 Ky. L. J. 73, 74.
'State v. Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 50 Atl. 37 (1901) State v. Lee, 6
W W Harr. (36 Del.) 11, 171 Aft. 195 (1933), State v Imundi, 45
R. I. 0 318, 121 Atl. 215 (1923)
" People v. Gingell, 211 Cal. 532, 296 Pac. 70 (1931) Rivers v.
State, 75 Fla. 401, 78 So. 343 (1918), State v. Henderson, 24 Ore.
100, 32 Pac. 1030 (1893).
"See note 10 supra.
"237 Ky. 35, 34 S. W 2d 941 (1931).
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law. The ruling was that the instruction of the trial court was improper in not informing the jury that they might find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter on the theory that he had used
more force than was reasonably necessary to prevent the felomous
taking of his chickens. The following instruction was given to be
used in another trial upon the same facts:
"The taking and carrying away .of chickens or other
fowls of the value of $2.00 or more without the consent
of the owner with the intent to convert the same to the
use of the taker, and to deprive permanently the owner of his property therein, is a felony
"The court instructs the jury that if you believe
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant, in this county and before the finding of the
indictment herein, did willfully shoot the deceased
with a pistol, a deadly weapon, from which he died
within a year and a day- and if you further believe
from the evidence that at the time he did so the deceased, Wilburn, and his companion McGuire, acting
in concert, were engaged in the act of committing the
felony aforesaid, or that said Wilburn was so doing,
and that the defendant without malice aforethought, or
not in a sudden affray or mn sudden heat and passion,
or not in self defense (as set out in Instructions Nos. 1,
2, and 4) shot and killed the deceased solely to protect
his property and to prevent said Wilburn and McGuire,
or said Wilburn, from committing the felony as aforesaid, then you are authorized to find the defendant
guilty of voluntary manslaughter
" (Italics supplied)
Since heat of passion is a necessary element of adequate provocation, the above instruction would permit a conviction of voluntary manslaughter where 'there was no provocation present as a
mitigating factor. The result is that there is at least a second category of voluntary manslaughter to be designated as catagory (B)
and defined as follows:
Voluntary manslaughter is also an intentional
homicide committed in the absence of malice aforethought and without provocation and resulting from
the use of more force than is reasonably necessary to
prevent the commission of a non-violent statutory
felony
It is not the writer's intention to make this note inclusive. In
support of the position that the common law definition does not
embrace all of the possible categories, it is to be noted that Dean
Burdick has written that "A definition which limits voluntary manslaughter to a homicide committed in the heat of passion caused
by provocation, confines this crime within bounds that are too
narrow."'" Also Professor Perkins in discussing mitigation other
"Id. at 42, 34 S. W 2d at 945.
14 2 BURDIcK, LAW OF CRIME
(1946) sec. 461.
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includes some killthan provocation has said, "manslaughter
ings involving other types of mitigation,"" and Bishop in is work
on criminal law has stated, "There are cases, not of excited passion,
wherein the conduct of the person slain has been such as to make
the killing, though in cold blood, manslaughter when otherwise it
would be murder."'"
In conclusion it is submitted that since provocation is not a
necessary element for a conviction of voluntary manslaughter, the
usual common law definition does not embrace every case of voluntary manslaughter under (3) of the analysis of intentional homicide suggested in the early part of this note. It may be concluded
that there are at least two, perhaps more, categories in common law
voluntary manslaughter.
JOHN M. KINNAIRD

'"Perkins, The Law of Homiczde (1946) 36 J. CRIM. L. 391, 426.

"2

BIsHOP, CRIMINAL LAW

(9th ed. 1923) sec. 698.

